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Abstract
We study when two-member household choice behavior is compatible with Pareto
optimality. We ask when an external observer of household choices, who does not know
the individuals’ preferences, can rationalize the choices as being Pareto-optimal. Our
main contribution is to reduce the problem of rationalization to a graph-coloring problem.
As a result, we obtain simple tests for Pareto optimal choice behavior. In addition to the
tests, and using our graph-theoretic representation, we show that Pareto rationalization
is equivalent to a system of quadratic equations being solvable.
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Implications of Pareto Efficiency for Two-Agent
(Household) Choice∗
Federico Echenique and Lozan Ivanov
1 Introduction
We study the implications of efficiency for choice behavior. Concretely, for a given
collective of agents, we want to describe the choices that are consistent with Pareto
optimality, when we are ignorant about the individual agents’ preferences. We develop
a series of simple necessary conditions (tests) for choice to be consistent with efficiency;
the tests lead up to a necessary and sufficient condition.
Consider a household (a two-person collective) that has to select an alternative from
a finite set. For instance, a couple may have to decide how to spend their income, or two
researchers who work at the same laboratory may have to choose which projects to fund
with their common grants.
Suppose we are given the households’ choice behavior. That is, we know what the
household would choose from each possible subset of alternatives. We ask when the
observed choice can be Pareto rationalized : we want to know when we can find two
preference relations, one for each household member, such that for any given subset of
alternatives, the choices are exactly the Pareto optimal alternatives within the set. We
are interested in what the choice behavior of such a household looks like, and how we
can test if a given household’s choices can be rationalized.
Pareto rationalization depends on certain conditions that the collective choices must
satisfy. Some conditions are classical: For example, if an alternative x is selected from
a set A, and we shrink A to B ⊆ A while maintaining x as still available in B, then x
must be chosen from B; this condition is usually called Chernoff’s Axiom. The classical
conditions allow us to work with two binary relations: revealed Pareto domination R
and Pareto indifference O. Pareto rationalization requires that there be two individual
preferences >1 and >2 such that x R y if and only if x Pareto dominates y, and x O y if
∗We thank Leeat Yariv for comments on an earlier draft. Our research was supported by the Lee
Center at Caltech.
and only if x and y are Pareto incomparable. We present new necessary and sufficient
conditions for Pareto rationalization.
The problem is motivated by revealed preference theory. In revealed preference theory,
one wants to know when the choice behavior of an individual agent is rational. By
observing his choice from each pair of alternatives, we can gain complete knowledge of
the agent’s preferences and then judge whether his behavior is rational or not according
to some external criterion (e.g. whether his preferences are acyclic, transitive, etc.)
We consider instead the collective behavior of two agents. Their choices reveal their
collective preferences, but we cannot reconstruct their individual preferences, and there-
fore cannot outright judge whether they are rational or not. To make it harder, the
observed group preferences, R and O, need not satisfy some classical rationality condi-
tions such as acyclicity.
We present the paper in terms of rationalizing choice, but one can also phrase the
results as a contribution to dimension theory: A partial order  on a set X has dimension
N if there are n linear orders >i, i = 1, . . . n such that
x  y ⇔ ∀i(x >i y).
We focus on the case n = 2. The problem was first studied by Dushnik and Miller (1941),
who provide a characterization of the two-agent rationalizable orders. The problems of
dimensions n > 2 are open.1 The Dushnik-Miller result is a deep result about partial
orders, but it does not constitute a useful test for rationalizability because it is non-
constructive. The characterization is in terms of a property of the partial order that
cannot be verified constructively.
In the economic literature, Sprumont (2001) has studied two-agent Pareto rational-
izability when one is interested in preferences with a particular structure.2 Sprumont
works with a continuum of alternatives, and studies Pareto two-agent rationalizations
with “regular” preferences. We instead focus on the basic discrete case, where we put
no structure on agents’ preferences. We shall work with strict preferences in the main
discussion of our results, but in the final section of the paper we show that household
choices are rationalizable in strict preferences if and only if they are rationalizable in
nonstrict preferences.
The following observation is key in our analysis. Consider a pair of alternatives, (x, y).
Then one of two things can happen: either one alternative is revealed Pareto preferred
to the other (say xRy if x is chosen out of the set {x, y}) or the two alternatives are not
Pareto ranked (xOy). The first case is simple: there is no ambiguity as any rationalizing
preferences must coincide with the Pareto order; if x R y and >1, >2 are rationalizing
preferences, then x >1 y and x >2 y. The second case presents us with a choice. If xO y
1Dimension theory was introduced by Dushnik and Miller in their 1941 article. A large literature on
dimension theory has been developed: the book by Trotter (2001) is a recent exposition.
2See also Sprumont (2000), who works out the relationship between Pareto and Nash rationalizability.
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then either x >1 y and y >2 x or y >1 x and x >2 y. In the first case, the direction of
individual preference is determinate. In the second case we have a degree of freedom and
we cannot infer individual preferences from the Pareto ranking. This degree of freedom
makes the problem of Pareto rationalization substantially different from classical revealed
preference theory.
a
c
bR
O O
Figure 1: (ac, bc): a R b or b R a, a O c and c O b.
We represent the problem in graph theoretic terms. We think of each alternative as
a vertex in a complete graph. For any two alternatives x and y, the edge xy is labeled
with R or O. The key building block of our analysis is in Figure 1, where a R b, a O c
and c O b. It is easy to see that if (>1, >2) is a rationalization then either c is the best
or the worst alternative for >1 out of the set {a, b, c}. Furthermore, if c is the best for
>1, then it is the worst for >2, and vice versa. So one agent’s preference points towards
c and other’s away from c.
A graph contains (in principle) many configurations like the one in Figure 1. If we
are trying to build a rationalization (>1, >2) then the decision we make on one such
configuration, in terms of whether agent 1 or agent 2 prefers c, affects the decision we
make on others. We reduce this problem to one of graph bi-coloring : one color for the
triplet (ac, bc) represents agent 1 preferring c out of {a, b, c}; the other color represents
agent 2 preferring c out of {a, b, c}.
This graph coloring approach allows us to formulate a simple test (a necessary condi-
tion) for Pareto rationalizability. The test is based on the two-coloring rationality condi-
tion being equivalent to the absence of certain odd cycles; this test is easy to implement.
Passing the test is, unfortunately, not sufficient to guarantee Pareto rationalizability.
We present another necessary condition for choice behavior to be Pareto rationalizable.
The condition is based on solving a particular quadratic system of equations where each
variable can only take the values 1 and -1. This condition, together with the test and
two classical revealed preference axioms, is sufficient for choice behavior to be Pareto
rationalizable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminary
results. In Section 3 we present the graph-theoretic notions we employ. Section 4 contains
our main results. We remark on the extension of our results to non-strict preferences in
Section 5. We present some conclusions in Section 6.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions
Let X be a nonempty, finite set of alternatives. We call a nonempty subset B ⊆ X a
budget. Denote by P(X) the set of all budgets B ⊆ X. A choice function is a function
g : P(X)→ P(X)
such that g(B) ⊆ B for all B ∈ P(X).
A strict preference relation on X is a total, antisymmetric and transitive binary
relation on X (a linear order).
Given two preference relations, >1 and >2, and a budget B ∈ P(X), say that a ∈ B
is Pareto dominated in B with respect to >1 and >2 if there is some b ∈ B such that
b >1 a and b >2 a; in this case we say that b Pareto dominates a (with respect to the two
preferences >1 and >2). We call a ∈ B Pareto efficient in B if it is not Pareto dominated
in B. Observe that if a and b are Pareto efficient in some set B ⊇ {a, b}, then either
a >1 b and b >2 a, or b >1 a and a >2 b
A choice function g is two-agent Pareto rationalizable if there are two strict preference
relations >1 and >2, such that for all B ∈ P(X), f(B) is the set of all Pareto efficient
alternatives in B with respect to >1 and >2. In this case, we say that (>1, >2) is a Pareto
rationalization of f , or a rationalizing pair.
A pair of sets (V,E) is a (directed) graph whenever E ⊆ V × V . We say that the
elements of V are the vertexes of the graph, and that (v, v′) ∈ E means that there is an
edge pointing from v to v′.
2.2 Preliminary results
We present two axioms that are necessary for Pareto rationalization. They are standard
axioms in the literature, and they are known to be necessary for single-agent rational-
ization as well (see e.g. Moulin (1991)). The results in Lemmas (1) and (2) are also
standard.
Axiom 1. For all B1, B2 ∈ P(X), if B1 ⊆ B2 and a ∈ B1 ∩ f(B2), then a ∈ f(B1).
The interpretation of Axiom 1 is that if f is Pareto rationalizable, and a is a Pareto
efficient choice among the alternatives in a given budget, it must remain Pareto efficient
among the alternatives of any smaller budget that contains a. Axiom 1 is a standard
axiom in choice theory, usually called Chernoff’s axiom (Moulin (1991)). We obtain the
following version of this standard result
Lemma 1. Axiom 1 is necessary for Pareto rationalizability.
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Proof. Suppose that f is Pareto rationalizable and that (>1, >2) is a rationalization. By
definition, we have that if a ∈ B1 ∩ f(B2) for some B1 ⊆ B2, then a is not dominated by
any b ∈ B2 (with respect to (>1, >2)). Since B1 ⊆ B2 it follows that a is not dominated
by any b ∈ B1. Thus, a is Pareto efficient in B1 and a ∈ f(B1), as f(B1) is the set of
all Pareto efficient alternatives in B1 with respect to the rationalization (>1, >2). This
proves the lemma.
Axiom 2. For all B1 ∈ P(X), if a ∈ B1 \ f(B1), then for some b ∈ f(B1)
f(ab) = b.3
The interpretation of Axiom 2 is that if f is Pareto rationalizable, and a is not Pareto
efficient among the alternatives in a given budget, then there must exist an efficient
alternative in this budget which Pareto dominates it. The following lemma is essentially
in Moulin (1991), page 306:
Lemma 2. Axiom 2 is necessary for Pareto rationalizability.
Proof. Suppose that (>1, >2) is a rationalization and a ∈ B1\f(B1) for some B1 ∈ P(X).
Then a is not Pareto efficient in B1 with respect to (>1, >2). If follows that a is Pareto
dominated in B1 by some other alternative a1 ∈ B1. If a1 /∈ f(B1) then a1 ∈ B1 \ f(B1)
and by the same argument a1 is Pareto dominated in B1 by some other alternative
a2 ∈ B1. And so on, since the set B1 is finite and rationalizing preferences are transitive,
we will eventually find an alternative b ∈ f(B1) that Pareto dominates a, and hence b is
the only Pareto efficient alternative in the budget ab: f(ab) = b, b ∈ f(B1).
We next introduce two binary relations. Given is a choice function f . The strict
revealed preference relation associated to f is the binary relation R defined as a R b if
f(ab) = a.4 The indifference relation associated to f is the binary relation O defined as
a O b and b O a if f(ab) = ab. Note that O is symmetric.
The following well-known (Moulin, 1991) observation illustrates the importance of R.
Lemma 3. If f satisfies Axioms 1 and 2, R is transitive.
Proof. Assume that f satisfies both axioms and a R b, b R c. Using Axiom 1 twice we
get b /∈ f(ab) ⇒ b /∈ f(abc) and c /∈ f(bc) ⇒ c /∈ f(abc). Since f(abc) is nonempty it
follows that f(abc) = a. Now Axiom 2 implies that f(ac) = a as a is the only alternative
in f(abc). Thus a R c and the relation R is transitive.
Remark. Note that O may not be transitive, as the following example with X = {a, b, c}
illustrates:
c >1 a >1 b,
b >2 c >2 a;
where a O b and b O c but c R a.
3We are going to abuse notation and write a1a2...at instead of {a1, a2, . . . , at}.
4The relation R is also called the base relation.
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We henceforward assume that the choice function f satisfies Axioms 1, 2 and so R is
transitive. We are interested in when a pair of linear orders (>1, >2) is a rationalization
of the choice function g, given that it satisfies both axioms. Suppose first that (>1, >2)
is a rationalization. Note f(ab) is either a singleton or f(ab) = ab. If f(ab) = a is a
singleton then a >1 b and a >2 b as a is the only efficient element in ab with respect to
(>1, >2). If f(ab) = ab, then both a and b must be efficient, meaning that
((a >1 b) and (b >2 a)) or ((a >2 b) and (b >1 a)) . (1)
We arrive at the following important observation.
Lemma 4. Suppose the choice function f satisfies Axioms 1 and 2. Then a pair of
binary relations (>1, >2), over the universal set X, is a rationalization of f if and only
if a >1 b and a >2 b whenever a R b, (1) holds whenever a O b, and both relations are
acyclic.
Proof. We already proved the forward direction of the claim. Conversely, suppose that
(>1, >2) is a pair of acyclic relations such that a >1 b and a >2 b whenever aR b, and (1)
holds whenever a O b. By these assumptions, >1 and >2 are total and antisymmetric as
well. Since both relations are acyclic, it follows that they must also be transitive and
hence linear orders.
Consider a budget B ∈ P(X) and an alternative b ∈ B\f(B). By Axiom 2, f(ab) = a
for some a ∈ f(B). That is, a R b. Then, by assumption, a >1 b and a >2 b, and so
b is Pareto dominated in B with respect to the pair (>1, >2). On the other hand, take
any a ∈ f(B) and suppose that for some c ∈ B, c >1 a and c >2 a. Since both relations
agree over the pair of alternatives (a, c), our assumptions imply that c R a. That is,
a /∈ f(ac). But a ∈ f(B) ∩ {a, c} and by Axiom 1 a ∈ f(ac), a contradiction. Thus,
c >1 a and c >2 a cannot simultaneously hold for any c ∈ B, which implies that a is not
Pareto dominated in B, i.e., a is Pareto efficient in B with respect to the pair of relations
(>1, >2). Since a ∈ f(B) and b ∈ B \ f(B) are generic elements of the corresponding
sets, we conclude that f(B) contains the Pareto efficient alternatives in B and only those.
Hence, (>1, >2) is a Pareto rationalization of the choice function f .
Axioms 1 and 2 are necessary. We present an example below to the effect that they
are not sufficient. By Lemma 4, then, it should be clear that property (1) captures
the restrictions in Pareto rationalizability, in addition to the standard properties in Ax-
ioms 1 and 2. In the next section we shall use a graph-theoretic structure to understand
property (1) better.
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3 A graph coloring problem
We proceed to illustrate how we translate the problem of characterizing Pareto rational-
izability into a graph-coloring problem. Suppose that (>1, >2) is a rationalization of the
choice function f . By Lemma 4, we know this is equivalent to (>1, >2) being a pair of
acyclic relations such that a >1 b and a >2 b whenever a R b, and (1) holds whenever
a O b. We can rewrite these two properties of (>1, >2) as
if a >1 b and a R b, then a >2 b; if a >1 b and a O b, then b >2 a. (2)
As a consequence, a rationalizing relation >1 defines a rationalization (>1, >2). A
choice function g defines R and O; so >1 and (2) gives us >2. This simple observation
will allow us to translate characterizing Pareto rationalizability into a graph-coloring
problem.
Let G be the directed graph
G = (X, {ab|a R b or a O b}).
The vertices of G are all the alternatives from the universal set X and the edges of G
represent all the revealed binary comparisons of alternatives in X: we label the edge (a, b)
by R if a R b or b R a, and we label the edge (a, b) by O if a O b or b O a. For example,
imagine three alternatives a,b and c for which a O c, c O b and a R b. The situation is
represented in Figure 1 in the Introduction.
The configuration in Figure 1 is crucial. This configuration would not be possible if
R described a single agent’s strict preference relation, and O described her indifference
relation. With a Pareto rationalization (>1, >2), we see that >1 must either point away
from c or point towards c:
Lemma 5. Suppose that (>1, >2) is a rationalization and a, b, c ∈ X are three alternatives
for which a O c, c O b, and a R b or b R a. Then the following is true
(a >1 c and b >1 c) or (c >1 a and c >1 b). (3)
Proof. Let a R b. We cannot have b >1 c and c >1 a, as this results in the cycle
a >1 b >1 c >1 a, contradicting the assumption that >1 is acyclic (we have a >1 b and
a >2 b since a R b). Similarly, we cannot have a >1 c and c >1 b because this implies
b >2 c and c >2 a, which contradicts the acyclicity of >2. Two possibilities remain:
either a >1 c and b >1 c, or c >1 a and c >1 b. That is, (3) holds. We readily see that,
after relabeling a and b, (3) also holds if we have b R a instead of a R b.
Remark. Statement (3) in Lemma 5 clearly holds for >2 as well; and if one of the alter-
natives in (3) holds for >1, the other holds for >2.
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Given that (3) holds for any rationalization (>1, >2) and any three alternatives
a, b, c ∈ X with a O c, c O b, and a R b or b R a, we seek to understand the struc-
ture of the graph G. Any necessary condition for G that we hope to derive is indirectly
a condition for the choice function f , as G depends on the revealed preference relations
R and O, which, in turn, correspond to choice functions satisfying Axioms 1 and 2.
We can express our observation (3) using a second graph, which is undirected:
F = ({ab|a 6= b}, {(ac, bc)|a R b, a O c, b O c}).
Note that the vertexes of F are edges of G; there is an edge between ac and bc if they
are in a relation like the one in Figure 1: they are elements of O which are related by R.
We say that the edge f = (ac, bc) ∈ F is colored 1 if (a >1 c and b >1 c), and that f is
colored −1 if (c >1 a and c >1 b). Consider Figure 1: the edge (ac, bc) is colored 1 when
>1 points away from the common vertex c; the edge is colored −1 when >1 points toward
the common vertex. Since the assumed rationalization (>1, >2) verifies equation (3) by
Lemma 5, it follows that it induces a coloring of every edge of the graph F . We now
obtain a simple necessary condition for rationalizability based on this coloring.
Consider two adjacent edges f1, f2 ∈ F ; let f1 = (ac, bc), for alternatives a, b, and
c such that the vertex bc of F is an endpoint of the edge f2. We have f2 = (cb, db)
or f2 = (bc, dc) for some other alternative d. The first possibility is represented on
the left in Figure 2 while the second possibility is on the right. When two adjacent
edges f1 = (ac, bc), f2 = (cb, db) are related as in Figure 2 on the left, we say that
they are dichromatic as they must have different colors in any rationalization. When
f1 = (ac, bc), f2 = (bc, dc) are related as in Figure 2 on the right, we say they are
monochromatic as they must have the same color.
Formally, we say that a pair of edges (f1, f2), of the graph F is monochromatic when
f1 = (ac, bc) and f2 = (bc, dc) for distinct alternatives a, b, c, d ∈ X. When f1 = (ac, bc)
and f2 = (cb, db) for distinct alternatives a, b, c, d ∈ X, we call the pair of edges (f1, f2)
dichromatic.
Lemma 6. Let (>1, >2) be a rationalization and f1, f2 be two adjacent edges in the graph
F . If they are related as on the left in Figure 2 then the two edges have different colors.
If f1, f2 are related as on the right, they have the same color.
Proof. Consider first the case f1 = (ac, bc), f2 = (cb, db). If the edge f1 is colored −1
then c >1 b, and by equation (3) d >1 b so that f2 is colored 1. Similarly, if f1 is colored
1 then b >1 c, and by (3) b >1 d: f2 is colored −1. Either way, f1 and f2 have different
colors. The second case f1 = (ac, bc), f2 = (bc, dc) is treated the same way.
These ideas allow us to formulate a simple condition.
Axiom 3. Every cycle in F has an even number of dichromatic pairs.
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ac
bR
O O
d
R
O
a
c
bR
O O
d
O
R
Figure 2: Left:(ac, bc) and (cb, db) are dichromatic; right: (ac, bc) and (bc, cd) are
monochromatic
We have argued that a rationalization implies a coloring of the edges of F in which
monochromatic pairs have the same color, and dichromatic pairs have opposite colors.
Coloring using two colors (bicoloring) is equivalent to the absence of a cycle in which
there is an odd number of vertexes forcing a switch in the color of adjacent edges (a
simple result in graph theory). In our particular case, the vertex linking two adjacent
edges of the graph F forces a switch in color if they are dichromatic and forces them to
have the same color if they are monochromatic. We get for free the following
Lemma 7. If f is Pareto rationalizable, it must satisfy Axiom 3.
We finish this section with an example of a choice function that satisfies Axioms 1
and 2, but not 3. Such a function is not two-agent Pareto rationalizable.
Example. Let X = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6} be the set of alternatives and define the choice
function g by the following table; the entry corresponding to row ai and column aj is
g({ai, aj}).
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
a1 a1 a3a1 a1a4 a1 a1a6
a2 a2a3 a4 a2a5 a2a6
a3 a4 a3a5 a6
a4 a4a5 a4a6
a5 a6
The table defines the relations R and O. It is then easy to extend g to all of P(X)
so that it satisfies Axioms 1 and 2.
Notice next that f1 = (a1a3, a2a3), f2 = (a3a2, a6a2), f3 = (a6a2, a5a2), f4 = (a2a5, a4a5),
f5 = (a4a5, a3a5), and f6 = (a5a3, a1a3) are edges of the graph F such that f1, f2 are
dichromatic, f2, f3 are monochromatic, f3, f4 are dichromatic, f4, f5 are monochromatic,
f5, f6 are dichromatic, and f6, f1 are monochromatic. Then f1f2f3f4f5f6f1 is a cycle in F
which has an odd number (three) of dichromatic pairs. See Figure 3, in which the edges
of G are drawn with continuous lines and the edges of F are drawn as dotted lines. In
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a5
a1 a2
a6
a4
a3
Figure 3: A choice function satisfying Axioms 1 and 2 but not 3.
Figure 3, an arrow at the end of an edge indicates the direction of R. The absence of
any edge or arrow indicates that the edge corresponds to O.
The choice function g then satisfies Axioms 1 and 2, but not Axiom 3.
4 Main results
Our main result is a characterization of Pareto rationalizability. We express the charac-
terization as a graph coloring problem in Theorem 8. We present the same characteriza-
tion in Theorem 10, in terms of a system of quadratic equations having a solution. The
version of the result in Theorem 10 may be computationally the most convenient.
In Section 3, we reduced the problem of Pareto rationalization to a problem of bi-
coloring the graph F . Our characterization of Pareto rationalization requires paying
special attention to certain configurations of edges in F .
We say that a triple of edges (f1, f2, f3) of the graph F is 3-cyclic provided
f1 = (ca, ea), f2 = (cb, eb), f3 = (ba, da),
for some distinct alternatives a, b, c, d, e ∈ X with dOe, dOc. Notice that (f1, (cd, ed), f3),
(f3, (bc.dc), f1) and (f3, (be, de), f1) are 3-cyclic triples as well and that the ordering of
the edges in a 3-cyclic triple matters.
The role of 3-cyclic edges becomes apparent in the following
Theorem 8. A choice function is Pareto rationalizable if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1-
3, and there is a coloring of the edges of the graph F (in 1 and -1) such that two edges in
a monochromatic pair have the same color, two edges in a dichromatic pair have different
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ab
c
d
R
Figure 4: A cycle for >1, indicated with directed edges.
colors, and for every 3-cyclic triple (f1, f2, f3) either f1 and f2 have the same color or f1
and f3 have the same color.
Proof. Let g be a choice function that satisfies the hypotheses. We are going to construct
a Pareto rationalization (>1, >2) of g. The construction starts by defining the two binary
relations >1 and >2 over only some pairs of alternatives from X at first, and then
extending them to the entire set X. For each pair of alternatives (a, b) with aR b, define
a >1 b and a >2 b. For each pair (a, b) define a >1 b, b >2 a if for some c ∈ X it is
the case that (ab, cb) ∈ F is colored 1 or (ba, ca) ∈ F is colored -1. The pair (>1, >2) is
currently only partially defined.
We present a trivial fact that will be invoked often in the sequel:
Lemma 9. Let x, y, z ∈ X be three distinct alternatives. If x >1 y >1 z and x O y O z,
then x O z.
We illustrate the rest of the argument using Figures 4, 5 and 6. Suppose there is a
>1-3-cycle a >1 b >1 c >1 a for some a, b, c ∈ X. It is easy to see that we must have
a O b O c O a: if all three of the revealed relations belong to R then R is not acyclic, a
contradiction; if exactly two of the relations belong to R then the third must also since
R is transitive, a contradiction; if only one of the relations belongs to R then we have
not colored each edge of the graph F .
We represent the situation in Figure 4; we omit the label on O edges to simplify
the figures. The bold edges with arrows indicate the preference >1; for example, the
preference a >1 b mandates an arrow on the ab edge pointing in the direction of a.
Now, a O b and a >1 b implies that there is d ∈ X such that either (ba, da) ∈ F or
(ab, db) ∈ F . Suppose, without loss of generality, that (ba, da) ∈ F is the case. Then
a O d and a >1 d as (ba, da) is colored −1; see Figure 4. Now consider the edge cd. By
Lemma 9 we must have c O d. Hence (bc, dc) must be an edge in F colored in 1. This
means that d >1 c. (We have assumed that (ba, da) ∈ F , but if we instead assume that
(ab, db) ∈ F , we end up with the same picture after relabeling a, b and c.)
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ab
c
d
e
R
R
Figure 5: Implied existence of d and e driving the cycle.
a
b
c
d
e
R
f3 f2
f1
R
Figure 6: f1 = (ca, ea),f2 = (cb, eb) and f3 = (ba, da).
Next, c O a and c >1 a imply the existence of some some e ∈ X such that either
(ca, ea) ∈ F or (ac, ec) ∈ F . Suppose without loss of generality that f1 = (ca, ea) ∈ F .
Then e O a and e >1 a, as (ca, ea) is colored with 1. See Figure 5.
Note that (ca, ea) ∈ F implies that c R e or e R c. We invoke Lemma 9 with e O a,
a O b, e >1 a, and a >1 b to get e O b and b O e. Hence, f2 = (cb, eb) ∈ F ; in addition,
b >1 c implies that f2 is colored −1 and thus b >1 e. See Figure 5. Now, d O e as an R
relation is not possible by Lemma 9. Then, (d R b) ∨ (b R d)) implies that (de, be) ∈ F ,
and b >1 e implies that (de, be) is colored 1. Hence, d >1 e. The case (ac, ec) ∈ F leads
to the same picture after relabeling a, b and c.
Consider the edges f1 = (ca, ea), f2 = (cb, eb) and f3 = (ba, da) which all belong to
the graph F . Notice that f3 colored −1, f2 colored −1, and f1 colored 1. In addition,
we have d O e, d O c. This means that the triple of edges (f1, f2, f3) is 3-cyclic with f1
and f2 having opposite colors, and f1 and f3 having opposite colors. We have reached a
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contradiction with the assumptions of the Lemma. Hence, there is no 3-cycle belonging
to the (not yet total) relation >1. The situation is represented in Figure 6.
Suppose there is a 3-cycle a >2 b >2 c >2 a which belongs to >2. As for >1, it must
be the case that a O b O c O a. But then a >1 c >1 b >1 a, a contradiction.
Suppose next that >1 is not acyclic: for some a1, a2, . . . , at ∈ X, t > 4 we have
a1 >1 a2 >1 . . . >1 at >1 a1. We may assume that this is the shortest cycle, meaning that
t is minimal. If a1 R a3 then there is a shorter cycle a1, a3, a4, . . . , at, a1, a contradiction;
if a3 R a1, then there is a 3-cycle belonging to >1, again a contradiction. If a3 R a1 then
there is a 3-cycle that belongs to >1, a contradiction. Hence, a1 O a3. Now suppose
that a1 R a2. If a2 R a3 then a1 R a3 as R is transitive, a contradiction. Then a2 O a3
and (a1a3, a2a3) must be an edge of the graph F that is colored in 1. We conclude that
a1 >1 a3 and there is a shorter cycle, a contradiction. So a1 O a2.
This allows us to conclude that a1Oa2O. . .OatOa1. Because a1Oa2 and a1 >1 a2, for
some b ∈ X either (a2a1, ba1) ∈ F or (a1a2, ba2) ∈ F . Suppose that (a2a1, ba1) ∈ F . Then
a1 >1 b. Now at >1 a1, a1 >1 a2 and a1 >1 b imply that at O a2 and at O b, by Lemma 9.
So (a2at, bat) is an edge in F . If it is colored in -1 we get a 3-cycle a1 >1 a2 >1 at >1 a1,
a contradiction. It should be colored in 1, so at >1 a2, and we once again have a shorter
cycle, a contradiction. The case (a1a2, ba2) ∈ F leads to a contradiction in a similar
fashion.
Therefore, >1 is acyclic and can be extended to a total, antisymmetric and transitive
relation (a preference relation) on X. In light of observation (2) in Section 3, the (ex-
tended) preference relation >1 extends >2 to a total and antisymmetric binary relation
on X which does not possess any 3-cycles. On the other hand, if a total relation has a
cycle, it is easy to see that it has a 3-cycle. It follows that >2 is also acyclic and Lemma 4
implies that (>1, >2) is a rationalization of the choice function g.
We finish the proof by proving the converse statement. Let (>1, >2) be a rationaliza-
tion of the choice function g. We have already shown that g must satisfy Axioms 1- 3.
We have also seen in Lemma 6 that the rationalization (>1, >2) induces a coloring of the
edges of the graph F that respects di- and monochromatic pairs. Finally, if (f1, f2, f3) is
a 3-cyclic triple and we suppose that f1 and f2 have opposite colors and f1 and f3 have
opposite colors, we must conclude that either a >1 b >1 c >1 a or a >1 c >1 b >1 a. A
contradiction of the transitivity of >1. Hence, f1 and f2 have the same color or f1 and
f3 have the same color.
Remark. The proof of Theorem 8 is constructive. Given a coloring of the edges of the
graph F , we described a simple procedure for constructing a rationalization (>1, >2) of
the given choice function: the rationalization must agree with the revealed relation R,
as well as the coloring of the graph F over pairs of alternatives ab which represent an
endpoint of an edge in the graph F . Next, we extend >1 to the entire set X, which also
determines >2 as a linear order on X. We showed that the pair (>1, >2) constructed in
this way is indeed a rationalization.
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Theorem 8 is a characterization of Pareto rationalizability. From the results in Sec-
tion 3, we know that, if a choice function satisfies Axioms 1-3 there is a coloring of
the edges of the induced graph F which assigns opposite colors to edges from a dichro-
matic pair and equal colors to edges from a monochromatic pair. Pareto rationalizability
amounts, over and above Axioms 1-3, to finding a coloring of the edges of F , which in
addition to respecting di- and monochromatic pairs also has the property that for every
3-cyclic triple (f1, f2, f3) either f1 and f2 have the same color or f1 and f3 have the same
color.
Notice that if there is a coloring of the edges of F that satisfies the conditions in
Theorem 8, we can reverse the color of every edge and still have a coloring that satisfies
those conditions: the reversed coloring leads to the same rationalizing pair as the original
one, with >2 in place of >1. To avoid dealing with this duality, and to simply our notation,
we introduce a third graph H. The vertexes of H are the edges of the graph F , and two
vertexes f1, f2 in H are joined by an edge in H if and only if there is a path in F
connecting f1 with f2.
In the graph F , the notions of monochromatic or dichromatic pairs of edges only
applied to adjacent edges; that is, edges with a common vertex. We can easily extend
this definition to pairs of edges that are connected by a path in F , calling a pair of
edges monochromatic if there is a path with an even number of dichromatic pairs join-
ing them, and dichromatic if there is a path with an odd number of dichromatic pairs
joining them. The more general notion of mono- and di-chromatic is well-defined under
Axiom 3, as Axiom 3 then insures that no pair of edges from F is both dichromatic and
monochromatic.
Under Axiom 3, then, we can extend our definitions of dichromatic and monochro-
matic edges in F to give a bi-coloring of H. We say that the edge f1f2 (in H) is colored 1
if the corresponding path (in F ) has an even number of dichromatic pairs, and is colored
-1 if the path has an odd number of dichromatic pairs.
Now, H is the dual graph of F . It is well-known and easy to see that Axiom 3 is
equivalent to
Axiom 3’. Every cycle in H has an even number of edges colored -1.
Observe that a choice function induces a coloring of the edges in H just like it labels
some pairs of edges in F as di- or mono-chromatic. We cannot choose the coloring of the
edges of H, in contrast to the coloring of F we have discussed above.
We now express the consequences of Theorem 8 for H using a system of equations.
A solution to the system of equations will be a coloring of the vertexes of H.
For the graph H, Theorem 8 implies the following. A choice function that satisfies
Axioms 1-3 is Pareto rationalizable if and only if there is a coloring of the vertexes of H
in 1 and -1, such that
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• two vertexes h1, h2 ∈ H, such that h1h2 is and edge in H, have equal colors if h1h2
is colored 1 and opposite colors if h1h2 is colored −1;
• for every 3-cyclic triple of vertexes (h1, h2, h3) either h1 and h2 have the same color
or h1 and h3 have the same color.
5
We introduce one variable for each vertex of H; these variables can take the values 1
or −1.
Let k be the number of 3-cyclic triples:
T1 = (h1,1, h1,2, h1,3), T2 = (h2,1, h2,2, h2,3), . . . , Tk = (hk,1, hk,2, hk,3).
Remark. As we observed before, 3-cyclic triples come in groups of four. It is sufficient
to satisfy the requirement in Theorem 8 only about one 3-cyclic triple out of those four
and we may choose to ignore the other three. For theoretical purposes, the redundancy
plays no role. For computationally constructing a Pareto rationalization, it would be
important to only include one representative 3-cyclic triple.
We proceed to describe a system of equations, named (*), by enumerating all the
component equations.
First, include the 3k equations
h2i,j = 1
in the system (*). These must be included because hi,j must take the value 1 or -1.
Next, if the same vertex belongs to two different 3-cyclic triples, we have that
hi1,j1 = hi2,j2
belongs to (*), where hi1,j1 and hi2,j2 are the same vertex in H. If hi1,j1 and hi2,j2 are two
vertexes for which hi1,j1hi2,j2 is an edge in H colored 1, then
hi1,j1 = hi2,j2
is an equation in the system; if hi1,j1hi2,j2 is an edge in H colored -1, then
hi1,j1 = −hi2,j2
must be included in the system of equations (*).
Finally, for every i = 1, 2, . . . , k, the equation
(hi,1hi,2 + hi,1hi,3 − 1)2 = 1
belongs to the system (*). Notice that hi,1 and hi,2 having opposite colors or hi,1 and
hi,3 having opposite colors is equivalent to hi,1hi,2 + hi,1hi,3 6= −2, which is equivalent to
hi,1hi,2 + hi,1hi,3 ∈ {0, 2}. This, in turn, is equivalent to (hi,1hi,2 + hi,1hi,3 − 1)2 = 1.
5A triple of vertexes (h1, h2, h3) in H is called 3-cyclic if and only if that same triple viewed as a
triple of edges in F , is 3-cyclic.
15
Axiom 4. The system of equations (*) has a solution.
Evidently, Axiom 4 is simply a reformulation of the conditions in Theorem 8. So
Axiom 4 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a coloring of the
vertexes of H in the hypotheses of Theorem 8. We thus obtain:
Theorem 10. The choice function f is Pareto rationalizable if and only if it satisfies
Axioms 1,2,3,4.
Unfortunately, the system (*) is not linear, and its solution may present significant
computational problems. That said, the construction of the system should be computa-
tionally feasible (all the graphs involved can be constructed in polynomial time). One
computational advantage of the system is that it does not involve equations of order
higher than 2, as h2i,j = 1 implies that
(hi,1hi,2 + hi,1hi,3 − 1)2 = 3 + 2hi,2hi,3 − 2hi,1hi,2 − 2hi,1hi,3.
5 Rationalizability in non-strict preferences
We proceed to discuss rationalization by non-strict preferences. We observe that our
characterization still holds in this case, when we define Pareto efficiency in the weak
sense that an alternative a in B is Pareto efficient if there is no b ∈ B that both agents
strictly prefer.
A choice function g is two-agent Pareto rationalizable in non-strict preferences if there
are two total, reflexive and transitive binary relations >1 and >2 on the universal set of
alternatives X, such that for all B ∈ P(X), f(B) is the set of Pareto efficient alternatives
in B with respect to (>1, >2). In this case, we say that (>1, >2) is a Pareto rationalization
of g in non-strict preferences.
Theorem 11. The choice function g is Pareto rationalizable in non-strict preferences if
and only if it satisfies Axioms 1,2,3,4.
Proof. Suppose g satisfies Axioms 1 - 4. Then Theorem 10 implies that g is rationalizable
by some strict preferences (>1, >2), and therefore g is also rationalizable by non-strict
preferences. On the other hand, suppose g is rationalizable by nonstrict (>1, >2). It is
readily seen that axioms 1-2 must still hold. Also, if a R b, b O c, c O a, then >1 and >2
must be strict on (a, b) and (b, c): if b =1 c then b =2 c and it must be the case that
aR c since aR b. This contradicts aO c. The remaining axioms 3, 4 only deal with these
tractable pairs b O c and c O a, over which there are can be no indifferences belonging to
rationalizing relations, and it follows that they are also necessary.
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6 Conclusion
We characterize two-agent Pareto rationalizability of choice functions. We present several
simple tests for Pareto rationalizability, most notably the verification of Axiom 3. This
axiom is a new consequence of Pareto rationalizability, and its verification seems to be
computationally simple.
Our characterization, on the other hand, essentially involves solving a system of
quadratic equations. Thus, applying our characterization may be computationally hard;
it may not present a substantial advantage over exhaustively searching over all possible
rationalizing linear orderings. For problems of a given size, though, it seems intuitive
that the constructions we have discovered (the graph H) simplifies the problem.
Finally, we have worked on the two-agent case. We do not know if our graph-theoretic
approach extends to the case when we have more than two agents. The difficulty is that
there is no two-coloring which allows us to formulate meaningful, simple graph tests,
which seem to lead in the direction of a characterization. The general problem with n
agents remains open.
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